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abstract 
Member states of the European Union are autonomous when it comes to the design of their social 
protection systems. However, they are committed by a Recommendation accepted by the European 
Council addressing the convergence of social protection objectives and policies. Beside that, it is 
expected that convergence of social protection systems could come about as a result of economic 
integration. In this paper we have examined whether such convergence has occurred during the past 
decades, using data on replacement rates and social expenditure ratios. We find a rather strong trend 
of relative convergence, but it does not follow that this trend is the result of the European integration.   
 
JEL-classification:  H53, and H55 
Keywords:  Social Protection, European Union 
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Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with the question whether social protection systems in the European 
Union have converged or diverged under the influence of the integration movement. Not only 
is convergence of social protection objectives and policies a specific aim of EU member 
states, the traditional opinion is that economic integration promotes progress in social 
protection across participating countries such that convergence of social protection systems 
follows more or less spontaneously. Theoretically, however, economic integration can be 
both beneficial and harmful to social protection systems. In the latter case, there may be 
convergence, but to ever-decreasing protection levels. 
The paper discusses recent recommendations and statements issued by various bodies of 
the European Union regarding the desirability of convergence. Thereafter it summarizes 
various theoretical arguments according to which economic integration may contribute to 
convergence or to divergence. But the largest part of the paper is devoted to empirical 
analyses using data on gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits for 14 EU 
countries covering two decades, and data on the share of GDP spent on social benefits 
covering four decades. The latter also allow a comparison of EU members with non-EU 
members. Even though we observe a strong trend of what we call relative convergence of 
gross replacement rates as well as of shares of social benefit expenditures among the 
members of the European Union, it does not immediately follow that this trend is the result of 
economic integration. 
 
 
Commitments of member states 
 
Already the founding fathers of the EEC expected social progress to result from economic 
integration. Partly as a result thereof, the European Treaty of 1957 only offers a legal basis 
for harmonisation of social policies in relation to the free movement of labour. Regulations 
concerning the social protection of migrant workers have been accepted as early as 1957. 
The social protection systems, however, remained fully in the realm of national sovereignty. 
This has not changed since then. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and the inclusion of the 
Social Protocol into the basic Treaty were a step forward in the social domain in general, but 
provide no basis for involvement of the European Union (henceforth: the EU) with social 
protection levels in the member states. 
Still, member states have accepted a certain degree of commitment in terms of social 
protection. This commitment is embodied in two recommendations accepted by the 
European Council in 1992. The first recommendation, of June 1992, deals with common 
criteria concerning sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems 
(92/441/EEC). The second recommendation, of July 1992, explicitly addresses the 
“convergence of social protection objectives and policies” (92/442/EEC). Arguments given for 
convergence are: 
- differences in social security may hamper the free movement of workers and exacerbate 
regional imbalances; 
- convergence seeks to guarantee the continuation and stimulate the development of 
social protection within the context of the completion of the internal market; 
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- member states face common problems, such as ageing of the population, 
unemployment, changing family structures and poverty; common objectives must act as 
pointers to the way social protection systems are modified to take account of these 
problems. 
 
Remarkably, this list does not mention that converging social protection systems can 
contribute to the creation of a level playing field on the internal market. In fact, the 
recommendation further stipulates broadly defined goals, but “without prejudice to the 
powers of the member states to establish the principles and organisation of their systems”. 
Finally, the monitoring is recommended of the progress achieved in relation to the 
convergence of social protection aims and policies across the Union. 
The desirability of convergence of member states' policies has been reconfirmed in several 
reports of the European Commission, such as the White Paper on European Social Policy of 
1994 and the recent reports on Social Protection in Europe. The 1998 Employment 
Guidelines, as a result of the Jobs Summit in Luxembourg at the end of 1997, can partly be 
seen as an implementation of the convergence strategy. A main line of action in these 
guidelines is to improve the employability of those out of work. This reflects a change in 
orientation of systems of social protection: a shift towards a more active policy designed to 
get people into employment rather than merely transferring income to those who are out of 
work. Though crucial in modernising social protection, this change in orientation does not 
have implications for benefit levels, coverage and eligibility criteria, i.e. for the scope and 
generosity of national systems. 
Thus it can be concluded that a start has been made with a more active policy towards 
convergence of social protection in the Community, but that member countries still remain 
autonomous when it comes to the design and generosity of their systems (Goudswaard and 
Vording, 1996). 
 
 
Possible effects of economic integration 
 
According to a well-known argument economic development undermines traditional 
solidarities in family and local structures (Chassard and Quintin, 1993). And increased labour 
mobility also creates a need for employment-related insurances and for broader networks of 
solidarity. At the same time, higher levels of income also offer the possibility to develop a 
system of social security with adequate protection levels. At least the funding of such a 
system will become easier. So, according to this line of reasoning, economic development 
strengthens the need for an extended system of social protection as well as the opportunity 
to fund it. And, to the extent that European integration promotes economic development by 
reducing uncertainty, lowering risk premiums and improving investment opportunities, it may 
therefore contribute to the expansion of such systems. 
 
On the other hand, it can be argued that economic integration may be harmful to national 
social security schemes. First, economic integration and a well-functioning internal market 
may stimulate migration. Migration as a result of relative price signals is economically 
efficient. A different situation arises however, when migration flows are provoked by 
differences in levels of social protection. In that case an adverse selection problem occurs: 
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individuals who expect to be net beneficiaries will be attracted to countries with generous 
social programs, while net contributors are deterred by the high tax burden in these 
countries. Consequently, the social protection systems there are confronted with increasing 
outlays as well as a narrowing financial base which will ultimately result in lower protection 
levels. This is a standard argument for centralising redistribution policies in an economic 
union (Lejour, 1996), although it can be shown that centralisation is not an inevitable 
consequence (Wildasin, 1991) and measures can be taken to limit and perhaps even 
eliminate the problem in practice. 
Another problem may occur when lower levels of social protection translate into lower labour 
costs. In that case economic integration and higher transparency can damage the 
competitive position of countries with relatively generous protection systems vis-à-vis other 
countries. The former may react by lowering protection levels and, thus, set into motion a 
"race to the bottom". In the end social protection may indeed converge, but only at a very low 
level of protection. This argument, however, applies only to the extent that generous social 
protection raises labour costs. Although it may indeed be practically relevant under certain 
conditions, an international comparison clearly shows that many countries can afford 
relatively high levels of protection without risking their competitive position. 
 
From the above brief discussion it can be concluded that theory does not clearly tell us 
whether economic integration leads to more or less social protection and whether there will 
be spontaneous convergence of social protection systems. The empirical analysis below is 
meant to shed some light on the actual development of social protection systems in the 
European Union and, more specifically, on the extent of convergence or divergence of these 
systems.  
 
 
Some statistical evidence 
 
Two sets of figures will be used here in an empirical analysis of the dynamics of social 
security systems. One set consists of social security expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
as derived from the OECD Economic Outlook of December 1998. The other set, obtained 
from the OECD data base, consists of replacement rates . Before reporting on the observed 
patterns, some properties of each of these variables will be briefly discussed. 
Social security expenditures as a percentage of GDP give an indication of the financial effort 
to provide social protection. Although it is a useful indicator, it also raises some ambiguities 
in international comparisons. Countries often use different definitions of social security and of 
specific social risks, such as unemployment and disability. Moreover, benefits may be 
provided by public and/or market institutions. Still, market provision may be regulated by the 
national government such that it is equivalent to public provision. The true nature of these 
various forms of social protection is not always reflected adequately in national statistics. 
A specific statistical problem is related to the tax treatment of social benefits. In some 
countries benefits are taxable, in others not. Benefits can also take the form of tax relief, for 
example child deduction. Adema (1999) has demonstrated the relevance of accounting for 
both the impact of tax regimes and private (mandatory or voluntary) arrangements on the 
share of GDP going to recipients of social benefits. Such a comprehensive approach 
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suggests that differences between levels of social effort in thirteen OECD countries are less 
pronounced than they seem to be in a restricted analysis. 
Unfortunately, the data set applied below does not allow such a comprehensive approach. It 
must also be realised that changes in expenditure ratios do not necessarily reflect policy 
changes. They may simply be the result of ageing populations, or of changes in 
unemployment levels. 
 
Comparative studies of social security systems have increasingly turned to using 
replacement rates as measures of the level of social protection in different countries. 
Replacement rates indicate which percentages of earnings are ‘replaced’ by social benefits 
when individuals become eligible for such benefits. But also this measure has its flaws 
(Whiteford, 1995). Some of the limitations are: 1) replacement rates are based on entitlement 
rules which differ between countries and often represent only the maximum payment in given 
circumstances; 2) benefits are often not fully indexed, implying that they represent a 
decreasing percentage of wages over time; 3) not all relevant benefits may be included; 4) 
also here taxation can blur the picture: net replacement rates may deviate strongly from 
gross rates. Bearing these limitations in mind, replacement rates are a useful indicator of the 
generosity of social transfer programs. 
 
Relative variation of replacement rates 
Table 1 presents figures on the gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits for 1979, 
1989 and 1997 in 14 EU countries, i.e. for all present members of the EU, except 
Luxembourg. Note that the average values of the gross replacement rates listed here 
increase over time, thereby illustrating the significant rise in social protection that took place 
during the two decades covered. Another remarkable development is the very rapid growth 
of replacement rates in Greece, Italy and Portugal. As these countries had very low rates at 
the start of the period, this development must have contributed to convergence of 
replacement rates in the group as a whole. 
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Table 1 Gross replacement rates unemployment benefits*, 14 EU countries, 
1979, 1989, 1997 
 
    1979  1989  1997 
 
Austria     29.3  29.3  31.0 
Belgium    46.3  42.1  39.8 
Denmark    49.8  51.5  66.4 
Finland     26.5  33.9  35.5 
France     24.0  36.9  36.5 
Germany    29.9  27.6  27.1 
Greece       6.7    9.2  22.3 
Ireland     28.1  26.9  30.0 
Italy       1.0    2.7  18.3 
Netherlands    47.5  53.2  46.9 
Portugal      7.4  31.7  33.4 
Spain     21.4  33.8  31.7 
Sweden    25.1  28.9  27.6 
United Kingdom    23.8  17.6  18.8 
 
Average    26.2  30.4  33.2 
 
Coefficient of variation    0.56   0.46   0.37 
Standard deviation   14.7   13.7   12.3 
 
 
*)  Benefits before tax as a percentage of previous earnings before tax as defined by legislated entitlements 
averaged across circumstances in which the unemployed person may be, taking as the two most significant 
cases the Average Production Worker (APW) level of earnings and two-third of the APW level of earnings. 
 
Source: OECD data base; data provided for by Glenn Cooper 
 
 
An objective test of convergence can be carried out using such statistical yardsticks as the 
variance and the standard deviation1. A drop in the value of these measures over time can 
be seen as a sign of convergence, and an increase as a sign of divergence. But below we 
also use another measure to test for tendencies of convergence or divergence. A property of 
the variance and the standard deviation namely is that their values rise with the average 
value of the data set to which they are applied.2 This consideration is relevant in the present 
case, because of the growing average found in Table 1. To account for this, we also use 
here the so-called coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the 
value of the average of the corresponding data set. In order to distinguish the results of the 
two sets of criteria, we apply the term relative convergence (divergence) when observing a 
drop (rise) in the value of the coefficient of variation and the term absolute convergence 
(divergence) when using the statistical variance or standard deviation as a criterion. 
The values of the coefficient of variation of the gross replacement rates given in Table 1 
show that the relative variation of the replacement rates has decreased considerably over 
time. Thereby they confirm the result of the visual inspection. As indicated, this drop in the 
                                                          
1  The variance of a set of observations is defined as the sum of the squared differences between the individual observations 
and their average, divided by the number of observations. The standard deviation is defined as the square root of the 
variance. 
2  In other words, when the data in a set are multiplied by a scalar larger than one to obtain a second set, the variance and 
the standard error of the second set are larger than those of the first, even though the relative variation has not changed. 
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coefficient of variation can be interpreted as a relative convergence of the replacement rates 
of unemployment benefits in the European Union during the period examined.  
The corresponding values of the standard deviation have also been listed in the table. They 
clearly reflect a downward trend implying that, at least since the beginning of the 1980s, the 
gross replacement rates have converged also in absolute terms. 
 
Relative variation of social benefit payments 
Social benefits paid are a much broader variable than replacement rates of unemployment 
benefits, as they encompass all social benefits and also reflect the number of beneficiaries 
involved. Necessarily, they are less precise and specific, but, expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, they give a good indication of the financial effort a country makes in terms of social 
protection. Still, in an international comparison, the qualifications mentioned earlier must be 
kept in mind. 
Annual figures on social benefits paid are available for a relatively long period, such that an 
international comparison can also include years before 1979. Table 2 presents data from 
1960 to 1999 with ten-year intervals also including data relating to five non-EU countries.  
 
Table 2 Social benefits paid as a % of GDP, 14 EU and 5 non-EU countries,  
1960, 1969, 1979, 1989, 1999* 
 
     1960  1969  1979  1989  1999 
 
Austria      7.57  11.21  15.51  14.71  15.71 
Belgium    11.35  13.70  20.85  20.62  21.16 
Denmark      6.17    8.68  14.96  17.81  16.92 
Finland      5.08    7.08    9.08  14.36  19.54 
France    12.74  14.82  18.63  21.09  23.55 
Germany    12.83  13.53  16.95  16.19  16.70 
Greece      4.91    7.68    8.57  15.49  15.54 
Ireland      4.07    7.76  11.64  14.62  13.64 
Italy       9.50  11.93  14.08  17.61  19.70 
Netherlands      7.17  12.92  19.93  18.26  17.75 
Portugal      2.26    2.50    7.03    8.25  12.50 
Spain       3.65    6.38  11.70  13.94  15.09 
Sweden      6.09    8.19  14.28  16.29  15.82 
United Kingdom     6.06    8.35  10.55  10.47  13.12 
 
Average 14 EU countries    7.17    9.70  13.75  15.53  16.91 
 
Australia      4.92    5.06    9.23    9.62  12.55 
Japan       3.75    4.46    9.84  10.94  14.51 
Norway      9.34  11.87  13.36  15.40  15.35 
Switzerland      5.94    8.54  12.93  13.36  20.07 
United States     5.72    7.23  10.72  11.33  13.75 
 
Average 5 non-EU countries   6.28    7.46  10.99  12.13  15.25 
 
 
* data relating to 1999 are estimates 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1998; see for details Annex 1 
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The significant rise in social protection observed inTable 1 for the replacement rates since 
1979 stands out also in Table 2. The latter shows that expenditures on social protection have 
in fact been rising rapidly already since 1960 in EU counties as well as in non-EU countries. 
Another similarity concerns the very high growth rates in countries with relatively low levels of 
social expenditure in early years, such as Greece and Portugal. Still, as can be expected, 
there are also some differences. A country like Italy, with a remarkably low replacement rate 
in 1979 does not show a clearly deviating performance in terms of social expenditures. And, 
vice versa, a country with relatively low social expenditures, such as Finland in 1979, has a 
replacement rate that is close to average. Similarly, Denmark's high replacement rates are 
not reflected in its social spending pattern. 
The following tentative conclusions can be obtained from the two tables. First of all, the 
rapidly increasing figures in both tables suggest that, in accordance with general expectation, 
higher levels of social protection go together with higher incomes per head. In fact, social 
protection appears to be a so-called luxury good, in the sense that expenditure grows more 
than proportionally, expressing itself in higher shares of income spent on social protection as 
income grows. Further, European countries with relatively low incomes per head tend to 
catch up rapidly in terms of protection levels. But, of course, the rise in the shares of income 
spent on social protection cannot go on forever; at some point saturation will set in and the 
growth of social expenditures will level off. In fact, figures for later years in Table 2 suggest 
that some European countries may already have reached that stage. We can also observe 
that national preferences for social protection seem to differ substantially. Especially Anglo-
Saxon countries do not seem to be prepared to sustain the high protection levels prevailing 
in other countries with the same level of income. This may well be another expression of 
cultural differences within the group of OECD countries. 
 
Figure 1 presents the development of the coefficients of variation of social benefits paid as a 
percentage of GDP between 1960 and 1999 for three country groups. The first group 
consists of the present member states of the EU3, except Luxembourg and Denmark for 
which sufficient data are lacking. Although the term is not literally correct, this group will from 
here on be referred to as the EU15. The second group comprises other OECD members4. It 
has been added in order to allow a comparison of the development in EU countries with non-
EU countries. The third group consists of the six countries that founded the forerunner of the 
European Union, the European Economic Community, in 1957. These countries are Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Although Luxembourg could not 
be included for lack of data, this group will be referred to as the EU6. 
                                                          
3  The present member states of the European Union are the countries listed in Table 1 plus Luxembourg. 
4  This group consists of Australia, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. 
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Figure 1 Variation coefficients of social benefits paid as a 
% of GDP, 1960-1999, selected country groups
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
EU6
EU15
OECD
ex EU15
Source: see below table 2 
 
 
The graph shows that the relative variation of the shares of income spent on social benefits 
in the EU15 has decreased quasi-continuously between 1960 and 1999. The rate of 
decrease of the coefficient of variation was high during the 1960s and 1980s and only 
moderate during the 1970s and 1990s. Still, over the entire period, the coefficient of variation 
was more than halved, reflecting a strong pattern of relative convergence.  
Evidently, this strong convergence among the EU15 cannot be attributed solely to 
membership of the European Union, if only because only six countries were members during 
the whole period, while the others joined later5. During the 1960s, when the tendency of 
relative convergence was particularly strong, most of the present members still had little 
reason to expect that they would eventually be part of the Union. Further, it appears that the 
founding members (the EU6) showed less relative convergence over the decades than the 
EU15, and even experienced considerable relative divergence during the 1970s. And finally, 
also the coefficient of variation of the non-EU countries fell considerably over the period as a 
whole, even though economic integration did not play a role here. 
Figure 1 also suggests that the EU6 have been relatively homogeneous from the start in 
terms of social benefits paid, resulting in relatively low values of the coefficient of variation 
since 1960. In fact, if the importance a society attaches to social protection is indeed an 
exponent of its culture, it is not surprising that precisely those European countries displaying 
a relatively high homogeneity in terms of social protection were the first to agree on a project 
of integration.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the European Economic Community in 
1957. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1972, followed by Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986 
and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. 
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Absolute variation of social benefit payments 
In this subsection we examine to what extent the development of the coefficient of variation 
observed above was driven by the development of the standard deviation6. For that purpose 
we use Figure 2 which presents the annual values of the standard deviation between 1960 
and 1999 for the same country groups as those appearing in Figure 1.  
Source: see below table 2 
 
 
It can immediately be seen that the strong, quasi-continuous relative convergence of the ratio 
of social benefits in the EU15 since the 1960s apparently has not been caused by an 
absolute convergence of these ratios. For this group of countries the standard deviation at 
the end of the period of observation appears to be approximately the same as it was at the 
beginning. And the non-EU countries -which also displayed relative convergence- even 
appear to diverge in absolute terms. So the relative convergence for these two groups over 
the period 1960-1999 is the result of the considerable rise in expenditures on social benefits 
in relation to GDP. 
However, Figure 2 also shows that this conclusion does not apply to all subperiods. For, 
during the period after 1980, absolute convergence of social benefit ratios occurred in the 
EU6 as well as in the EU15. And it may be significant that this phenomenon -also observed 
in Table 1 for the unemployment replacement rates, an entirely different indicator- coincides 
with the considerable strengthening of European economic integration during the same 
period. For example, it seems unlikely that present-day EU members can let their social 
policies diverge as strongly in response to an external shock as the EU6 still could after the 
oil crisis of 1973. And it is also worth noting that, in contrast to the EU members, the non-EU 
countries have been on an absolute diverging trend since 1980. Taken together, these 
observations suggest that European integration may well have contributed to an absolute 
convergence of social protection among the participants during the past two decades. 
Figure 2 Standard deviation of social benefits paid as a 
% of GDP, 1960-1999, selected country groups
0
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Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have examined the extent in which convergence of social protection 
systems has occurred in the European Union during the past decades. We used data on 
gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits in the countries of the European Union 
since 1979 and annual data on social benefit payments as a percentage of GDP in the EU 
member countries as well as in five non-EU countries. The latter data set covers the four 
decades since1960. We found indeed a considerable drop in the coefficients of variation of 
both variables. In the terminology adopted here, these developments point to a strong 
relative convergence in the sphere of social protection. Still, some additional comments are 
in order. 
First of all, it should be noted that tendencies of convergence or divergence of shares of 
expenditures on social protection within groups of countries are a natural result of a few well-
known, general phenomena, apart from economic integration. Such phenomena are: the 
luxury-good character of social protection, varying rates of growth of income per head and 
varying preferences for social expenditures.  
Consider two countries with similar preferences and growth rates, but different levels of 
income per head. Suppose that the poorer country, in contrast to the other country, has not 
yet reached the level of income where social security is mostly provided through public 
channels. An absolute divergence of public expenditures on social protection will result. It is 
also easy to see that two countries with similar preferences and incomes, but with different 
growth rates will also tend to diverge. And when two countries have different levels of income 
and the poorer country grows faster, the two are likely to show convergence. 
Varying preferences for social protection in combination with similar growth rates and levels 
of income per head can cause convergence as well as divergence. For example, when a 
poor country has a strong urge to raise its relatively low level of protection, it may gradually 
bridge the gap with a richer country without that urge. Such a situation is likely to occur when 
the richer country has reached its level of saturation in terms of social expenditures. A 
tendency of convergence will result. But the reverse development may occur as well. All this 
goes to say that convergence of social protection systems among EU countries may result 
from factors other than economic integration. 
Secondly, the observed strong convergence of social protection occurred in relative terms, 
as expressed by the coefficient of variation. This measure relates the standard deviation to 
the average of a data set, so it falls when the value of the average rises. This is of course 
precisely what happened in the past decades to variables expressing the size and generosity 
of social protection systems in OECD countries. In fact, it has been demonstrated above that 
the values of the social benefits paid as a percentage of GDP did not show any convergence 
in absolute terms over the past four decades.  
Further, the EU6 -the countries that have been involved in the integration movement from the 
start- display no clear relative convergence of the rates of social benefits paid over the period 
1960-1999. On the other hand, the corresponding coefficients of variation calculated for non-
EU members of the OECD appear to be much lower in the 1990s than they were in the 
1960s. So the latter countries, although they are scattered all over the world and not involved 
in economic integration, show more relative convergence than the EU6.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6  Recall that the coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation over the average. 
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But these qualifications apply to the entire forty-year period between 1960 and 1999. It 
should be pointed out namely, that the last two decades -other than the 1960s and 1970s- do 
indeed show signs of relative and absolute convergence of social benefit systems in the 
European Union. These tendencies can be observed in both data sets examined here: the 
gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits and the shares of social benefit 
expenditures in GDP. It is perhaps significant that they coincide with a period during which 
the process of economic integration in Europe was much intensified.  
It is still too early to conclude categorically that convergence of social benefit systems as a 
result of the European integration movement has set in. And even if the tendency of 
convergence would appear to be structural, there may be other factors than economic 
integration at work. Still, it is very well conceivable that a comprehensive process of 
economic integration, as takes place now in Europe, promotes convergence through the 
intensified contacts between participating countries. Especially successful countries may 
have a demonstration effect on other member countries. Depending on the generosity of the 
systems of such model countries, the tendency may then be upward or downward oriented. 
In this way the proclaimed objective of convergence of social policies in the European Union 
would come about as a spontaneous development and not so much as a result of pertinent 
decisions. 
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Annex 1 Data Social Benefits as % of GDP, 1960-1999 
 
 
countries 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
                     
Austria 7.57 7.59 8.26 8.68 8.91 8.96 9.12 9.84 10.53 11.21 12.25 12.97 13.74 13.91 13.30 13.55 13.87 14.12 14.98 15.51 
Australia 4.92 5.25 5.16 5.54 5.33 5.31 5.61 4.85 4.73 5.10 5.43 5.54 6.26 6.47 6.91 8.45 8.97 9.50 9.44 9.23 
Belgium 11.35 11.00 11.33 11.45 10.89 12.41 12.77 13.00 14.03 13.70 14.08 14.23 14.87 15.43 15.94 18.76 19.27 19.99 20.34 20.85 
Canada 8.02 6.85 6.73 6.48 6.31 6.17 6.14 7.09 7.47 7.59 8.11 8.76 9.40 9.05 9.38 10.29 10.11 10.48 10.77 9.85 
Denmark 6.17 6.19 6.32 6.66 6.21 6.73 7.23 7.99 8.65 8.68 10.41 10.87 10.93 10.67 11.59 13.38 13.13 13.75 14.53 14.96 
Finland 5.08 5.40 5.69 5.73 5.78 6.24 6.80 7.38 7.46 7.08 7.03 7.62 7.84 7.32 7.58 8.24 8.90 9.70 9.88 9.08 
France 12.74 13.33 14.14 13.58 13.90 14.22 14.36 14.49 14.78 14.82 14.80 14.79 14.98 15.14 15.54 17.41 17.33 17.73 18.48 18.63 
Germany 12.83 12.78 12.88 12.99 13.02 13.43 13.77 14.96 13.97 13.53 13.07 13.21 13.71 13.73 14.86 17.92 17.71 17.66 17.25 16.95 
Greece 4.91 5.01 5.73 6.12 6.26 6.82 7.09 7.76 8.03 7.68 7.64 7.69 7.26 6.47 6.85 7.13 7.45 8.23 9.01 8.57 
Ireland 4.07 5.79 5.77 6.46 6.32 6.46 7.46 7.26 7.61 7.76 8.61 9.16 8.79 8.96 10.13 12.28 12.60 11.66 11.36 11.64 
Italy 9.50 9.32 9.78 10.31 10.55 12.04 12.21 11.62 12.18 11.93 11.94 12.63 13.46 13.13 12.79 14.55 14.36 13.89 14.84 14.08 
Japan 3.75 3.72 3.86 4.19 4.32 4.69 4.68 4.48 4.50 4.46 4.63 4.81 5.14 5.15 6.18 7.74 8.49 8.91 9.43 9.84 
Netherlands 7.17 7.22 7.72 9.32 9.38 10.52 11.30 11.70 12.39 12.92 13.37 14.28 15.03 15.31 16.18 17.64 17.70 18.41 19.24 19.93 
Norway 9.34 9.66 10.27 10.53 10.52 10.65 11.00 11.51 11.67 11.87 11.53 11.72 11.47 11.29 11.39 12.30 12.74 12.76 13.34 13.36 
Spain 3.65 3.39 3.14 3.78 4.81 5.10 5.17 5.65 6.15 6.38 6.65 7.42 7.52 7.63 7.65 8.32 8.97 9.31 10.73 11.70 
Sweden 6.09 6.12 6.20 6.51 6.37 6.52 6.82 7.54 8.03 8.19 8.23 8.88 9.27 9.24 11.19 11.29 12.11 13.48 14.20 14.28 
Switzerland 5.94 6.15 6.24 6.22 7.02 7.17 7.25 7.51 7.51 8.54 8.35 8.26 7.85 9.82 10.31 12.09 12.88 13.12 13.07 12.93 
Portugal 2.26 2.34 2.45 2.58 2.72 2.81 2.91 2.70 2.52 2.50 2.55 2.56 3.54 4.05 4.47 6.17 7.06 7.18 7.38 7.03 
united kingdom 6.06 6.23 6.53 6.96 6.73 7.20 7.36 7.89 8.40 8.35 8.36 8.28 9.03 8.63 9.39 9.71 10.18 10.29 10.60 10.55 
United  States 5.72 6.32 6.06 6.07 5.88 5.85 5.95 6.69 7.03 7.23 8.29 9.06 9.19 9.38 10.32 11.93 11.68 11.19 10.69 10.72 
                     
                     
countries 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
                     
Austria 13.10 13.47 13.67 13.79 14.09 14.50 14.66 15.05 14.93 14.71 14.51 14.43 14.51 15.11 15.33 15.54 15.58 15.49 15.79 15.71 
Australia 9.06 9.04 9.61 10.79 10.89 10.77 10.78 10.39 10.04 9.62 10.46 11.73 12.55 12.84 12.74 12.90 13.11 12.87 12.71 12.55 
Belgium 23.39 25.22 25.14 25.86 25.28 22.41 22.11 22.02 21.12 20.62 20.55 21.24 21.51 21.79 21.45 21.49 21.62 21.42 21.29 21.16 
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Denmark n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.97 17.81 17.86 18.38 18.89 19.67 21.23 20.34 19.73 18.80 17.86 16.92 
Finland 11.89 12.09 13.29 14.02 13.97 14.76 15.26 15.37 14.75 14.36 15.75 19.64 23.68 25.23 25.08 23.52 22.61 21.22 19.92 19.54 
France 19.15 20.28 21.23 21.52 21.77 22.07 21.91 21.57 21.42 21.09 21.24 21.76 22.41 23.63 23.28 23.25 23.41 23.62 23.51 23.55 
Germany 17.06 17.57 17.83 17.35 16.73 16.50 16.31 16.59 16.51 16.19 15.67 16.64 17.08 17.89 17.66 17.85 17.61 17.37 17.12 16.70 
Greece 9.47 11.28 13.43 13.73 14.23 15.37 15.40 15.49 15.02 15.49 15.35 15.21 15.16 15.61 15.44 15.76 15.45 15.27 15.43 15.54 
Ireland 13.43 14.38 16.32 16.95 16.77 17.16 17.61 17.33 16.64 14.62 14.27 15.17 15.73 15.79 15.69 15.05 14.98 14.45 13.84 13.64 
Italy 14.19 15.79 16.34 17.31 16.82 17.17 17.24 17.35 17.35 17.61 18.20 18.31 19.34 19.54 19.50 18.90 19.23 19.61 19.46 19.70 
Japan 10.06 10.53 10.96 11.23 10.96 10.90 11.19 11.56 11.29 10.94 11.35 10.82 11.28 11.90 12.47 13.37 13.51 13.78 14.14 14.51 
Netherlands 20.70 21.07 21.56 21.01 20.09 19.50 19.33 19.73 19.59 18.26 19.61 19.98 20.53 20.95 19.73 19.36 18.79 18.98 18.04 17.75 
Norway 11.33 11.63 12.03 12.37 12.09 11.85 12.73 13.18 14.49 15.40 15.95 16.37 17.06 16.93 16.37 15.80 15.18 14.97 15.26 15.35 
Spain 12.36 13.71 13.56 13.96 13.89 14.33 13.96 13.81 13.87 13.94 14.40 15.24 16.09 16.57 16.46 15.74 15.72 15.36 15.19 15.09 
Sweden 14.47 15.18 15.20 15.30 14.68 15.01 15.36 15.60 16.37 16.29 16.32 17.26 18.56 19.96 19.28 18.09 17.49 16.72 16.26 15.82 
Switzerland 12.01 11.91 12.77 13.19 13.54 13.36 13.53 13.63 13.74 13.36 13.39 14.20 15.58 17.08 17.21 17.40 18.51 19.23 20.03 20.07 
Portugal 7.21 8.00 8.21 8.20 8.16 8.06 8.20 8.46 8.46 8.25 8.75 9.67 10.23 11.13 11.78 12.27 12.60 12.62 12.52 12.50 
united kingdom 10.56 11.81 12.65 12.63 12.76 12.70 12.85 12.00 11.07 10.47 10.69 12.04 13.37 14.03 13.85 13.66 13.42 13.00 13.15 13.12 
United States 11.41 11.58 12.44 12.36 11.48 11.50 11.55 11.37 11.25 11.33 11.83 12.19 13.65 13.83 13.64 13.79 13.86 13.70 13.65 13.75 
 
data relating to 1999 are estimates 
 
Source: OECD Database 
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